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Abstract
Given the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions,
why couldn’t nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the
profession? We tell a story in which the status of nursing as a ‘vo-
cation’ implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of
applicants attracted. The underlying mechanism accords with the no-
tion that increasing wages might attract the ‘wrong sort’ of people
into the profession and highlights an (in)eﬃciency wage mechanism,
particular to vocations, which makes wages sticky upwards. The anal-
ysis has implications for job design in vocation-based sectors such as
nursing and teaching.
‘Nurses (in the NHS) have always been low paid. Good nurses
aren’t in it for the money - they have a vocation’ Sunday Times
(10 January 1999)
∗Anthony Heyes is at Department of Economics, Royal Holloway College, London Uni-
versity, Surrey TW20 0EX, England (a.heyes@rhul.ac.uk). I am grateful to Jeﬀ Frank,
Dan Anderberg, Craig Brett, Robert Chambers and Peth Tuppe for helpful comments and
the ‘Ruby Team’ midwives at St. Peters Hospital, Chertsey for inspiration.
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1 A simple (in)eﬃciency wage story
What do we mean when we say that somebody has a ‘vocation’ for nursing
(or teaching, or working with the handicapped)? We take it to mean two
things; (a) that that person is particularly devoted, going ‘beyond the call of
duty’ in doing their job and (b) they do the job because they like doing it or
feel a need to do it (they ‘care’).1 This is based on standard definitions, for
example -
“Vocation / n 1 [C] a job you do because you have a strong
feeling that doing this job is a purpose of your life, especially
because you want to help other people: Teaching isn’t just a
job its a vocation. 2 [C,U] a special ability for or devotion to
a particular job or activity, especially one that gives service to
other people: [+ for] He has a vocation for teaching.” (Longmans
Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1995).
Consider the following formalisation. The wage for being a nurse is w.
The ith individual from a pool of potential applicants has a privately observed
alternative outside option which would pay ri, where ri is distributed in the
population according to a log-concave density function f . The associated
cumulative is denoted F .
There are two types of people. Those with a vocation for the job and
those without. If somebody without a vocation becomes a nurse then they
give quality of care qL and receive a wage w. If somebody with a vocation
does likewise, however, they give care qH > qL, receive the wage w but also
receive a non-pecuniary benefit v (what we will refer to as a ‘vocational
premium’).
The q parameter can be thought of as a quality or productivity measure
and qL can be thought of as the maximum contractually enforceable level.
The diﬀerence between qH and qL relate to the extra-role behaviors already
described. The story here is based upon incomplete contracts, then, so it
is important that q be less than perfectly contractible. The quality of care
given by a particular nurse may not be observed by the principal (or may not
be verifiable by a third party). Two examples. A nurse can be contracted to
1By ‘going beyond the call of duty’ we mean that in carrying out their duties they do
a better job than could be ensured by contractual compulsion. There is an element of
voluntarism in the individual’s workplace behaviour.
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monitor the patients on a ward for an 8-hour shift, or to administer a partic-
ular number of injections, but cannot be contractually obliged to give those
injections with ‘tender loving care’. A teacher can be contracted to deliver
a course of lectures, but availability for hallway conversation - something
which motivates students and reinforces the learning process - is essentially
voluntary, and something which only the devoted teacher (the teacher with
a vocation) is willing to give.2
Frey (1993) developed the notion of ‘instrinsic motivation’ which drives
individuals to work harder at an activity than a conventional inspection of the
private marginal costs and benefits of eﬀort would predict. Here individuals
would exhibit excess morale in the execution of those tasks for which he has
a vocation.3
In a similar vein, management theorists have a well-developed model
of ‘good soldier syndrome’ (Bateman and Organ (1983), Organ (1988)).
“Individuals in organizations exhibit a wide range of behaviors, from the
minimalist who does the least possible to maintain membership, to those
(good soldiers) who go beyond expectations, engaging in extra-role behaviors
that are discretionary, going beyond those measured by formal job evalua-
tions.” (Turnipseed (2002: 2)). In the current setting the assumption we will
make will be that particular individuals will engage in such behaviors when
matched with tasks for which they have a vocation.
Whilst each individual knows privately whether or not they have a par-
ticular vocation the fraction of those in the relevant population who have a
vocation will be denoted π and is assumed common knowledge.
Somebody without a vocation applies to become a nurse if and only if
w > ri (1)
whereas somebody with a vocation does so if and only if
w + v > ri. (2)
Other things being equal, then, somebody with a vocation is more likely
to choose this career.
2There may, of course, be scope for performance-related pay to play a motivational
role in both of these contexts. Our analysis relates to performance above the maximum
contractually enforceable level.
3In the labour market context he primary contention of Frey relates to “the tendency
of extrinsic motivation (e.g. organizational incentive schems) to drive out instrinsic moti-
vation (e.g. the internal drive to excel at your vocation)” (Rabin (1998: 12)).
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Denote as p(w, γ) the proportion of applicants that have a vocation given
an oﬀered wage w and a particular value of a ‘job content’ variable which
we will define and motivate in Section 2. Given that the vocational-status
of an individual is assumed unobservable to the employer p will also be the
proportion of employed nurses with a vocation.4
Ignoring γ (which we will see later equates with holding γ = 1) we can
note that
p(w, γ) = π.F (w + v)π.F (w + v) + (1− π).F (w) . (3)
Diﬀerentiation with respect to w gives
Proposition 1 Increasing the wage will decrease the proportion of employed
nurses who have a vocation.
The proof is straight-forward. Diﬀerentiating 3 yields
∂p(w, 1)
∂w =
π(1− π)(F (w)F 0(w + v) + F (w + v).F 0(w))
D2
where D is the denominator in 3. This implies that ∂p(w, 1)/∂w < 0 if and
only if
F (w + v)
f(w + v)
>
F (w)
f(w)
,
a condition which holds everywhere for any log-concave function.
This is an interesting result, and ‘drives’ the paper. It says that increasing
the wage will, other things being equal, reduce the proportion of applicants
(and hence employees) who have a vocation. It corresponds to the notion
that high wages might attact the ‘wrong sort’ of person. In the current
setting - where the ‘right sort’ of person over-performs (compared to what
can be ensured by contract) - this matters.
A variety of authors have devised eﬃciency wage models incorporat-
ing mechanisms which imply a (causal) link between increased wages and
increased performance. Examples include Summers (1988), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) and Yellen (1984). In the model here, in contrast, an increase
in w necessarily reduces the quality of work done by the average employee.
4There may exist screening technologies (interviews, psychometric tests etc.) that allow
the extent of an individual applicants vocation to be assessed - atleast imperfectly - and
we ignore these here.
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The mechanism relies on an unconventional self-selection constraint, which
we have argued is particular to vocations, whereby higher productivity work-
ers tend to have lower reservation wages.
It is important to recognize that vocation, as conceived here, is concep-
tually diﬀerent to the notions of ‘organizational citizenship behavior’ (OCB,
Organ (1988)) or ‘public service motivation’ (PSM, Francois (2000)), under
each of which the individual is assumed motivated by organizational output.
“Suppose all workers are endowed with PSM. This is an outcome-oriented
motivation so the workers do not care who provides the service, and do not
get utility from the very act of providing it, rather they care about the ser-
vice level. ... This is diﬀerent from an action-oriented motivation under
which agents experience an increase in utility just by performing certain
actions” (Francois (2000: 276)). These are alternative ad hoc behavioral
assumptions and whilst outcome-orientation seems plausible in the context
of public service ethic more generally, we do not believe it corresponds well
with the phenomenon of ‘vocation’. The analogous assumption here would
render an individual with a vocation equally happy to work as a merchant
banker and then channel the money into the teaching of handicapped chil-
dren (if an eﬃcient transmission mechanism existed) as to do the equivalent
teaching himself. We do not believe that this would capture the usual under-
standing of the term ‘vocation’ (nor the dictionary definition) which is more
action-based - a desire by an individual to be directly engaged in the worthy
activity. Our apporach is more akin, then, to the Rose-Ackerman’s (1996)
action-oriented conception of PSM.
So what? The mechanism itself is potentially interesting in its own right.
It also has the potential to generate unfamiliar implications when built into
a model of health-care provision. These will depend upon the assumptions
made about the structure and objectives of the health provider.
2 Example: Nurses in a monopoly NHS
Suppose there exists a monopoly supplier of health called a National Health
Service (NHS).
The supply of nurses is denoted L(w, γ) where w is the wage and 0 ≤ γ ≤
1 is a job content variable which measures the fraction of a nurses working
day spent ‘at the bedside’ (tb) or in direct contact with patients. The rest
of a nurse’s day is spent on other tasks not involving direct contact patient
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care which we label ‘administration’ (ta).
A nurse without a vocation is assumed indiﬀerent between time spent
on administration and time spent at the bedside. A nurse with a vocation
derives a non-pecuniary vocational premium on (and only on) that fraction
of time spent in direct patient contact. Including the job content variable
is not essential for the main points that we want to illustrate (those that
have regard to wage and quality eﬀects), but does allow us to say something
about job design issues in vocational settings Chung and Ross (1977)). If
not convinced by the assumption made on job design and vocational reward
then the reader can ignore γ.
Inequality 1 remains unchanged, then, whilst 2 becomes
w + v.γ > ri. (2’)
Both ta and tb are assumed valuable inputs to the production of care.
Consider Figure 1. The −45◦ line captures the time constraint for a single
nurse. Standard assumptions about the production technology yield convex
isocare lines and the point of tangency between one of these and the time
constraint imply a care-maximising value of γ for a nurse of known type.
Significantly, that value of γ will vary by type. In particular, the marginal
product of time spent at the bedside is everywhere higher for a nurse with a
vocation than for one without such that γ1 (the care-maximising value given
that the nurse in question has a vocation) is greater than γ0 (the analogous
value given that she doesn’t).
We will denote the total production of care by a nurse with a vocation to
be h(γ|V ). Without specifiying a particular production technology (though
any with standard features would suﬃce) we will assume that h(γ|V ) is twice
diﬀerentiable and monotonically decreasing around γ1. We make similar
assumptions for h(γ|NV ) and assume, further, that
d(h(γ|V )− h(γ|NV ))
dγ ≥ 0 (4)
It is true by construction that h(0|V ) = h(0|NV ). The assumption in 4
says that any marginal increase in γ, and hence the proportion of a nurses
time spent at the bedside, cannot reduce the productivity advantage othat a
nurse with a vocation has over one without. This is reasonable.
We abstract from non-nursing inputs and assume that the NHS hires
nurses such as to maximise net production of care subject to an exogenous
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budget constraint (thsi is dual to the problem of minimizing the cost of
delivering some externally determined care level).
As noted, the labour-supply constaint will always be binding such that
the NHS’s problem becomes choosing w and γ to maximise
L(w, γ). ((p(w, γ).h(γ|V ) + (1− p(w, γ)).h(γ|NV ))) (5)
subject to
w.L(w, γ) ≤ B.
The term in big brackets in (5) is the care provided by an average nurse,
where that average depends upon the proportion exhibiting a vocation. That
propsotionis, of course, endogenous, and is sensitive to changes in wage and
job content.
We restrict attention to contracts uniform in γ. This is in part motivated
by the institutional realities of the NHS in the United Kingdom (and other
countries) where nursing terms and conditions are determined centrally. In
addition, however, the practicalities of hospital management may preclude a
solution in which applicants select amonst a menu of contracts diﬀering in
γ. It may be possible to run a hospital such that at any time 60% of nurses
are at the bedside and 40% are involved in administration, such that random
allocation of daily tasks would mean that over a long enough period (say a
year) γ would converge on 0.6 for all nurses. Practicalities, however, may
make it impractical to treat individual nurses heterogenously.
Assuming that the budget constraint binds we can define the Lagrangean
G(w, γ) = L(w, γ).Ω(w, γ)− λ.[w.L(w, γ)−B] (6)
where
Ω(w, γ) = p(w, γ).h(γ|V ) + (1− p(w, γ)).h(γ|NV ))
is the average care produced by an employed nurse. The first-order con-
ditions associated with an interior solution to the NHS’s problems are:
Gw =
∂L
∂w. (Ω− λw) + L.Ωw − λL (7)
Gγ =
∂L
∂γ . (Ω− λw) + L.Ωγ (8)
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and
Gλ = B − wL(w, γ) = 0 (9)
Where, significantly,
Ωw = pw.(h(γ|V )− h(γ|NV )) < 0
and
Ωγ = pγ.(h(γ|V )− h(γ|NV )) + phγ(γ|V ) + (1− p)hγ(γ|NV )
The first two conditions have some non-standard features. Increasing w
increases labor supply, but reduces the proportion with a vocation implying
a loss in average productivity (Ωw < 0). Increasing γ increases labor supply
but has a qualitatively ambiguous aﬀect upon average productivity.
The adverse impact of raising wages (and/or cutting γ) impacts, then,
upon job design. If γ0 is the optimal value of the job content variable taking
p as exogenous (i.e. assuming pw = pγ = 0, which we will take to be con-
ventional wisdom), we can compare γ0 with γ∗ by noting that if γ is set to
ensure
Gγ(γ0) = 0
then since
Gγ(γ∗) = Gγ(γ0) + L.pγ.(h(γ|V )− h(γ|NV )) > 0
it must be the case (given the convexity of the problem) that γ0 < γ∗.
This provides a foundation for the criticism, often levelled at the NHS in
the United Kingdon, that it has been mistaken in redesigning the job of a
nurse in such a way that the typical nurse now spends less than half of her
time in direct contact with patients (there is a campaign in the UK to ‘let
the nurses nurse’). The trend away tb is said to have reduced morale amongst
nurses and lead to lower productivity, and many of the most capable nurses
leaving the profession. This is consistent with the story here.
A similar exercise with respect to wages implies that if w is set to ensure
Gw(w
0) = 0
then
Gw(w
∗) = Gw(w
0) + L.pw.(h(γ|V )− h(γ|NV )) < 0,
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implying that w0 > w∗. Defining ‘standard analysis’ to be that which pro-
ceeds on the basis that vocational-motivation in the workforce is exogenous
(pw = pγ = 0), this leads to the following:
Proposition 2 If nursing is a vocation (in the sense defined) then nurses
should be (a) paid less and (b) spend more time ‘at the bedside’ than standard
analysis would predict.
The mechanism is based on the incentives for self-selection into the profes-
sion.5 Individuals with a vocation over-perform when given the opportunity
to do so (when put at the bedside), and enjoy doing so. Decreasing the wage
and increasing the proportion of time spent on the vocationally-rewarding ac-
tivity increases the proportion of individuals applying for nursing jobs who
have a vocation.
3 Conclusions
This short paper has provided a simple mechanism for why increasing wages
paid to workers in vocation-intensive sectors (such as nursing and teaching)
may be more costly than just the additional payroll cost. Other things equal
a lowly-paid nurse is more likely to have a vocation, and so over-perform in
his role, than a highly paid one. This accords with our intuition that a higher
wage may attract the ‘wrong sort’ of person.
The mechanism has implications for the provision of healthcare, as the
example in 2 illustrates. It does not suggest that a healthcare organization
cannot pay more to attract more nurses, but suggests that there is a cost
to so doing in terms of the ‘type’ that will be attracted. It also suggests
that raising nursing wages in order to mitigate shortage of supply should
become easier as either (a) an applicants ‘vocation’ becomes more readily
observabel (through psychometric testing, for example) or, (b), the quality
of care provided becomes more fully-contractible. It also suggests that a
political desire to ‘give more’ to nurses - as many people would like to do -
might face a hurdle in terms of eﬃciency.
5It is quite diﬀerent from the mechanism identified by Francois (2000), for example,
where all agents are identical. Preston (1989) hypothesises that diﬀerent types of individ-
uals will be likely to be attracted into profit versus non-profit firms.
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